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Russian Neo-Nazis Participate in ‘Denazifying’ Ukraine – Der Spiegel

At least two neo-Nazi groups are fighting for Russian forces in Ukraine, throwing into question Moscow’s claims of “denazifying” its neighbor, German weekly Der Spiegel reported Sunday, citing a confidential intelligence report.

The document shared with German ministries by the BND intelligence service does not provide the exact number of far-right fighters, but identifies them as the Russian Imperial Legion and Rusich groups.

Their involvement “makes the ostensible reason for war, the so-called ‘denazification’ of Ukraine, absurd,” BND is quoted as saying.

Both groups are thought to have participated in the war between Moscow-backed, pro-Russian separatists and Kyiv that broke out in eastern Ukraine in 2014. Several reports have linked Rusich with Wagner, a shadowy, Kremlin-linked private military company.

Russia sent troops into Ukraine on Feb. 24 with the stated aim of “denazifying and demilitarizing” its pro-Western neighbor, before shifting its focus toward eastern Ukraine for the campaign's second phase in late March.

The Russian Imperial Legion is a paramilitary arm of the ultranationalist Russian Imperial Movement, which the United States designated as a terrorist organization in 2020.

“Whether this decision [to join the conflict in Ukraine] was made at the request of or in consultation with the Russian leadership” is unclear, the BND analysis writes.

The Russian Imperial Legion announced its decision to enter combat operations in Ukraine shortly after its leader Denis Gariyev called on supporters to “be patient” in early March, the report states. Rusich is believed to have become involved no later than early April.

The Russian Imperial Movement’s flag was seen in Ukraine by the Guardian in Mid-March Meanwhile,. Britain’s The Times located Rusich fighters crossing into eastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region near the Russian border in early April.

Gariyev, his deputy and two other right-wing extremists are believed to have been wounded in the fighting, BND said in the report cited by Der Spiegel. Rusich founder Alexei Milchakov was wounded as soon as the group entered Ukraine.

Milchakov and Rusich co-founder Yan Petrovsky had met at a Russian Imperial Movement paramilitary training program, according to The Times. Both were pictured in the BND report cited by Der Spiegel with a swastika flag and a Hitler salute.

The BND identified another Rusich member, Alexander M., as a military correspondent at Russia’s Channel One state broadcaster, according to Der Spiegel.

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Putin has said that “De-Nazification” of Ukraine is one of his key objectives, and that it is the main justification for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin media even brands all those who oppose Russian aggression as “Neo-Nazis.”

At the onset of the invasion, Russian propaganda clearly distinguished between the Ukrainian “fraternal people” and the “criminal regime” in Kyiv. In his address in the early hours of 24 February, Putin said, addressing the Armed Forces of Ukraine: “Take power into your own hands. It looks like it will be easier for us to come to terms with you than with this gang of drug addicts and Neo-Nazis, who settled in Kyiv and took the entire Ukrainian people hostage.”

Later, the Kremlin and the pro-government media began to substitute certain concepts: “nationalists” and “Neo-Nazis” became synonymous with the Ukrainian Army, volunteer battalions, and territorial defence forces, which have put up massive resistance against the Russian invaders. Pro-Kremlin media headlines and newscast rhetoric are full of phrases about “hours spent under targeted fire by nationalists” or Russian units and their proxies “who managed to drive nationalists out of the most residential areas in the city.”

But still after 8 weeks of war, the Kremlin propagandists refer to Ukrainians daring to oppose Russian occupation as “Nazis.” For example, for Margarita Simonyan, the head of one of the Kremlin’s main mouthpieces, RT, it came as an unpleasant surprise that “a significant part of Ukraine was engulfed in the madness of Nazism.” On one of her panel shows, she said: “Previously, I also thought that there were a few of them, but I definitely could not imagine that there were so many!”

Why does Russian propaganda massively and indiscriminately brand all Ukrainians as Nazis? First of all, it’s about dehumanising the nation in the eyes of the Russians. The Kremlin needs to give them something that will make Russians hate Ukrainians and justify in their eyes the atrocities committed against Ukrainians by the Russian military, the annihilation of Ukrainian cities. How could this be done? It turned out to be that simple: to an average Russian, who has been under the harsh influence of the Kremlin’s propaganda machine for years, it’s enough to say: “You know what? They are all Nazis there, we shouldn’t feel sorry for them, it’s okay to kill them all!” Which is what the Russian forces are doing.

Meanwhile, in Russia, people get detained and prosecuted for phrases such as “No to fascism” and “fascism shall not pass” – such slogans are now equated with “discrediting” the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Putin’s statements that the power in Ukraine is controlled by neo-Nazis is blatant falsehood. As any other country, Ukraine has some problems with far-right movements. In Russia itself, there are no fewer ultra-right, Neo-Nazi and nationalist, sharply xenophobic groups and organizations close to them in spirit. Moreover, there are people today in the Russian circles of power who used to openly back extremely nationalist views and participated in the infamous “Russian Marches.” Traditionally, Russian law enforcement are trying to find a “Ukrainian trace” in pretty much anything, presenting ultra-right groups as “branches of Ukrainian radical movements.”

The Russian ultra-right are frequently in the news focus, and there are still plenty of skinhead gangs that go out terrorising and murdering representatives of various Central Asian ethnic groups, while caveman nationalists keep chanting their favourite “Moscow is for Muscovites” song.

The uncomfortable truth is that Russia has long and regularly made accusations against former Soviet republics about supporting neo-Nazism, But the reality as borne out by the obscene behaviour of the Red Army in Ukraine is that Russia is itself the main breeding ground for today’s Nazis, and it is this evil that the world must address urgently and destroy the demon before it spreads.

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Russia sends in notorious neo-Nazi mercenaries to Ukraine The openly fascist and far-Right fighters in the Rusich task force undermine Russia's claims it is fighting to 'de-Nazify' Ukraine

Neo-Nazi mercenaries known for their brutality in conflicts in Syria and the 2014 war in Crimea have been deployed by Russia in Ukraine....

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Features

Racism Behind Russia’s ultra-nationalist crackdown Despite targeting neo-Nazis and other hate groups, the Kremlin is rolling out its own version of the ‘Russian world’.

Moscow, Russia – Lanky, bespectacled and nerdy, the defendant said he was merely a publicist who advocated ideas that are now “heard on the Russia television channel”, a national TV network.

But a Moscow City Court jury found Ilya Goryachev, 33, guilty of illegal arms possession, masterminding five killings, and organising a brutal neo-Nazi gang that hatched plans to create a “Fourth Reich” in Russia.

Goryachev fainted on July 24 while a judge was reading the verdict that sentenced him to life in jail.

He claimed earlier he was a “political prisoner” framed by the FSB, Russia’s main KGB-successor intelligence agency, and spouted the names of Kremlin officials, lawmakers, and Orthodox Church clerics he once worked for.

His trial epitomised the government’s crackdown on white supremacist neo-Nazis and ultra-nationalist groups that held massive rallies, killed hundreds of non-Russians, and advocated the anti-migrant idea of “Russia for ethnic Russians”, which is now shared by more than half the population.

Yet amid this crackdown, President Vladimir Putin’s government has also sought to forge its own state nationalism – and used elements of the ultra-nationalist agenda in its increasingly anti-Western, neo-conservative and isolationist ideology that the Kremlin started to forge after last year’s annexation of Crimea.

“The nationalist rhetoric has always been present in the Kremlin’s political discourse, but of course, it has become more swaggering, insolent, bold after Crimea,” Andrey Kolesnikov of the Moscow Carnegie Center, a think-tank, told Al Jazeera.

This ideology is disseminated by the Kremlin’s propaganda machine – and is indeed heard on the “Russia” television channel.

“Just because the government wants to keep its monopoly on nationalism – and this is one of the most important political goals, because this ideology is popular and among other [factors] keeps Putin’s ratings high – it responds very harshly to manifestations of nationalist extremism,” Kolesnikov added.

Hate groups

Goryachev was found guilty of founding the neo-Nazi group BORN, or the Military Organization of Russian Nationalists. Unlike other neo-Nazi gangs that hunted down dark-skinned non-Russians, BORN mostly targeted “race traitors”, or ethnic Russians who confronted their ideology.

Between 2008-10, BORN members killed 10 people, including a human rights lawyer, a journalist, a judge who had sentenced several ultranationalists to jail, and three anti-Nazi activists.

They also killed a Muay Thai world champion and decapitated a Tajik man – placing his head in a government office with a note promising more murders.

BORN and dozens of similar groups mushroomed in the 2000s amid an influx of millions of labour migrants from ex-Soviet Central Asia and Russia’s Muslim Caucasus region, where two wars in Chechnya fuelled unemployment and prompted attacks on Russia’s urban centres.

Racially motivated attacks peaked in 2008, when militant ultra-nationalists killed at least 110 people and left 487 wounded, according to Sova, a Moscow-based hate crimes monitor.

The rankled Kremlin responded by jailing hundreds of neo-Nazis and ultra-nationalists from groups with names such as White Wolves, Northern Frontier, or Russian Cleansing, Sova said.

The number of hate crimes plummeted. In the first half of 2015, four people have been killed and 37 wounded, it said.

But despite the pressure, the ultra-nationalists still enlist up to 20,000 people who are busy training in gyms and forests throughout Russia, Sova’s director said.

“There’s less attacks and more military drills,” Alexander Verkhovsky told Al Jazeera.

Fearing arrests, many ultra-nationalists fled Russia – sometimes preferring to fight in eastern Ukraine on both sides of the conflict.

“I’m the only remaining leader and I am under investigation” for white supremacist speeches during Russian Marches, the annual get-togethers of ultra-nationalists in Moscow and Russia’s largest cities, nationalist leader Dmitry Demushkin told Al Jazeera.

With a full red beard, short auburn hair, and white shirt with traditional Slavic ornaments, Demushkin looked like a character from a 19th-century Russian novel.

But his not-so-distant past reveals another character – he is one of Russia’s first skinheads who had a swastika tattooed on his shoulder, boasted of his skills with knives, and founded Slavic Union, a white supremacist group whose Russian acronym SS intentionally mimicked the one used by the Nazis’ infamous paramilitaries.

A court banned the group in 2010 as extremist, and Demushkin’s latest creature – the movement that failed to register as a political party – was suspended in August.

“The Kremlin has long been preoccupied with borrowing [the nationalist] agenda. And to do that, it needed to destroy the political movement of Russian nationalists that was thousands of men strong,” Demushkin said.

The largest players in the field of official, Kremlin-sanctioned nationalism are the deeply conservative and immensely powerful Russian Orthodox Church, the resurgent “armies” of Cossacks, czarist-era paramilitary forces, and right-wing parties.

The most outspoken nationalist is Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a 69-year-old politician with Jewish roots who heads the LDPR party that holds 56 out of 450 seats in the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, and who served as a deputy speaker for more than a decade.

The outspoken nationalist ran for president five times campaigning on promises to “return” Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states to Russia, install barbed-wire around Chechnya and Dagestan, Russia’s violence-plagued Muslim provinces, and expel non-Russian labour migrants.

But his pledges and party are widely seen as pseudo-opposition and the Kremlin’s tool to “sterilise nationalist voices”, according to Kolesnikov.

European far-right

While uprooting domestic far-right groups, the Kremlin cultivates ties with their ideological counterparts in the European Union to promote Moscow’s agenda.

“Russian influence in the affairs of the far right is a phenomenon seen all over Europe as a key risk for Euro-Atlantic integration at both the national and the Union level,” the Political Capital Institute, a Budapest-based think-tank, said in 2014.

In April, representatives of Western far-right political parties, including neo-Nazi groups from Germany, Greece, and the UK, met for a Kremlin-funded conference in St Petersburg, Russia’s former imperial capital and second-largest city.

Russian trolls spread government propaganda During the conference dubbed the International Russian Conservative Forum, they called on their governments to “protect” Christian values – and stop the new “Cold War” against Russia.

In recent years, the Kremlin has also politicised the idea of the “Russian world”, or a multi-million-strong Russian diaspora in former Soviet republics and throughout the world whose interests Moscow now seeks to represent and protect.

“The Russian man, or so say more inclusively, the man of the Russian world, thinks that there is a certain moral calling,” Putin said in 2014.

He added the Western ideals of individualism and personal success “are not enough for us”, and patriotic self-sacrifice and one’s readiness to “die for the motherland” is what makes Russians themselves.

Some Russia observers disagree, however.

“In recent years Putin has misappropriated the term ‘Russian world’ and made it a political slogan that almost implies, ‘if you speak Russian you belong in Russia’,” British historian Timothy Garton Ash wrote.

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Russian War Nationalism: Nationalist Practices, Empire, Conservatism, and Orthodoxy

by Alexandra Martin Brankova — Mar. 10, 2023

The start of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war intensified the domestic expressions of different forms of Russian nationalism, from extremist circles and nationalist intellectuals to policy, public debates, and media spaces.

In the Russian Federation, the line between state and non-state actors is blurred. Nationalist groups operate in a controlled landscape where anti-extremism legislation defines which organisations are allowed to be active. Websites, social media channels and other media platforms can be taken down by the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor). Censorship has intensified since March 2022, targeting oppositional groups, independent media outlets, and Meta social media (such as Facebook or Instagram), by marking them as extremist. The regulations shape a climate of limited ideological plurality where right-wing extremist movements promoting oppositional views and exclusionary nationalism are among the most censored actors. Fractions with visions that overlap with the government can operate undisturbed.

Russian nationalist groups differ in whether they see Russia as a mono- or multi-ethnic society. The former camp includes right-wing extremist groups, which are inward-looking and Russo-centric while the latter groups support imperialist, outward-looking narratives for a multi-ethnic nation. Discourses of militarism, multipolarity, messianism, conservatism, and political Orthodoxy are ubiquitous. However, divides between civic and ethnic, national and imperial identity lines cannot be applied in a straightforward manner to the Russian case. There are groups displaying both imperialist and ethno-nationalist standpoints that operate without being labelled as extremists. The so-called imperialists do not have a unified ideological front: some groups support the Soviet legacy, territorial claims, and secular governance while others are longing for the return of a monarchical empire and a tsar alongside the Church. Here, focus will be on the practices and discourses of three active and imperialist Russian nationalist organisations: the right-wing extremist Russian Imperial Movement, the nationalist and conservative Tsargrad Society, and Izborskii Club.

It is important to understand such groups since they have a strategic function for the Russian war effort in Ukraine. This includes recruitment and training for the frontlines (RIM), as well as the formation of an ideological foundation for current policies and the media agenda (Tsargrad and Izborskii Club). The list of nationalist groups labelled extremist since the 2000s (published by the Ministry of Justice), demonstrates that the state is tolerant of such groups, whilst censoring oppositional movements together with extremist ethno-nationalists ones. Major far-right and far-left organisations were banned in the early 2000s (e.g. the National Bolsheviks, the Slavic Union, the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, the All-Russian National Union, and the Russian Socialist Society). The period between 2014 and 2021 saw the prohibition of Ukrainian groups too, as well as Russian grassroot actors such as football fans, sports and hooligan associations, skinhead movements, and youth organisations. Far-right organisation was scattered and decentralised as a result. However, other nationalist groups filled the vacuum, and managed to operate strategically without state repression.

The Russian Imperial Movement: Military training for the frontlines, empire, and monarchism The far-right Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), founded in 2001, is one of the nationalist groups which provides military training, and has actively participated in the wars on Ukraine since 2014. RIM was designated as a terrorist group by the US State Senate in 2020, and by the Canadian Government in 2021, due to the provision of paramilitary training for European white supremacists and neo-Nazis. In 2022 the movement mobilised its military arm, the ”Imperial Legion”, and maintains training facilities at their ”Partisan Centre” in Saint Petersburg. RIM has specific requirements for volunteers to the Imperial Legion, including adherence to Orthodoxy, conservative political views, physical fitness, and no alcohol or drug dependency. Volunteers can choose between participation in armed conflicts or civilian projects.

Social media and the digitalisation of wartime practices are crucial to RIM’s communications. For instance, public social media spaces are used to announce recruitment rounds, give live updates from the front, and provide details about casualties. Videos about topics such as combat and firearm training, tactical medicine, or the psychology of wartime stress are distributed through public social media channels as educational material for volunteers. The movement also engages in cultural practices, such as the celebration of Orthodox holidays, and commemorations of Russian monarchs, patriarchs and other historical figures.

RIM’s ideology can be summarised as far-right ethno-nationalism, imperialist monarchism, Orthodoxy, and Russian cultural chauvinism. RIM describes itself as adhering to the triad of “God, Tsar, Nation”, (reconceptualising Sergey Uvarov’s formula “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality”). Messianism and the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome are common themes in their programme. Russia is seen as the heir of the Byzantine empire, in terms of its moral mission to preserve Orthodox Christianity and conservative family values. The movement promotes an imperialist territorial imaginary, where Belarus and Ukraine are presented as “White Russia” and “Little Russia”. While much of their discourse overlaps with Kremlin ideology, RIM is at times critical of state decisions and elites. For instance, live updates during the retreat of RIM from Kherson in November 2022 portrayed it as a “betrayal” and “corruption”, indicating serious discontent with the regime.

Tsargrad Society and Tsargrad Television: The entanglement of the grand imperial imaginary, Orthodoxy, and conservative television in a digital media ecosystem Tsargrad Society (previously known as the Double-Headed Eagle), led by the Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, with its associated online television channel Tsargrad TV, is one of the most dynamic digital media nationalist ecosystems. Tsargrad TV was removed from YouTube after US sanctions against Konstantin Malofeev, but remains visible on Telegram, VKontakte (VK), and live broadcasts via their web platforms. Interestingly, according to Medialogia, Tsargrad TV became one of the top 10 most cited internet sources in Russia in May 2022, when state censorship of liberal and independent media outlets began. Tsargrad Society’s manifesto envisages the Russian state as a “civilisation of the North mastering the vast spaces of Eurasia”, а concept borrowed from Aleksandr Dugin’s Eurasianists. Dugin often appears on Tsargrad TV and comments on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, while Konstantin Malofeev held a speech at the funeral of Darya Dugina in Moscow.

Similar to RIM, Tsargrad Society often uses the concepts of the “Third Rome” or “Holy Rus” to frame the Russian Federation as promoting traditional family values, juxtaposed to a liberal and decadent Europe/West. Russian cultural centrism is key, especially when discussing immigration policy. Publications demand the assimilation of immigrants into Russian culture and language. Tsargrad lobbies for the introduction of professional restrictions based on qualifications such as knowledge of Russian, and the prioritisation of Russian citizens in recruitment. Some of the stated goals of Tsargrad are the “revival of the Russian empire with its historical borders” including the Baltic states, Central Asia, Caucasus, Moldavia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

Whilst Tsargrad Society appears to be aligned or cooperating with the Kremlin on some matters, it holds divergent positions on others. On one hand, representatives of the Society participate in various state committees, and in conferences about government objectives related to demographics, family support, and migration policy, as well as joint initiatives with the Russian Orthodox Church. On the other hand, Tsargrad presents populist voices to Russian audiences, branding its content as an alternative to mainstream television. For example, despite demonstrating general support for the Russo-Ukrainian war, Tsargrad television distributed materials and 24/7 legal advice on how to avoid military conscription on social media and via a telephone hotline.

Izborskii Club: A platform for national unification and ideological production Izborskii Club is a platform which unifies a diverse body of Russian left- and right-wing nationalists, and contributes to the state’s patriotic policy, and agenda-setting for state media. The Club brings together figures such as Aleksandr Prokhanov, Alexandr Dugin, Valeri Korovin, Natalya Narochnitskaya, and Metropolitan Tikhon (Shevkunov), facilitating cooperation among imperialist nationalists. Unlike Tsargrad, which aims to engage broader audiences through media, Izborski Club is a think tank where different ideas such as the “Russian Dream”, the “Russian Ark”, or notions about Russia’s “cosmic” function are articulated. Their journal Russian Strategies (Russkie Strategii) is crucial to the communication of their ideas, and are supplemented with video content, round tables and conferences.

Discourses about the juxtaposition of Russia and the West were produced before the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, but became more common in 2022–23. The conflict is framed as a fight for the survival of the Russian Federation, and the preservation of its sovereignty, resources and values - a global geopolitical battle with NATO and the USA. The Club works closely with state institutions and has been financed by the Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives, which aims to produce content for the state’s educational system. Similar to Tsargrad TV, the Club has developed a network with regional branches and local initiatives.

Conclusion The Russian Imperial Movement, Tsargrad Society, and Izborskii Club are only some of the actors that shape the current Russian nationalist landscape. However, they provide examples of synergies across domestic nationalist groups and overlapping identity discourses of empire, conservatism, Orthodoxy, and autocracy. Categories such as ethnic, civic, cultural, and imperial are entangled and negotiated in line with government discourses and frameworks, and in-group imaginaries. Nationalist cultural production is becoming more prevalent both in digital and traditional media spaces. While independent and oppositional media channels are restricted, only one year since the invasion, selected nationalist voices have filled the vacuum in Russian public space.

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To remind:

People who supported Jeremy Corbyn: Nazis.

People who support Palestinian rights: Nazis.

People who criticize Israel: Nazis.

People who didn't vote for Hillary Clinton: Nazis.

Soldiers with Nazi insignia and ideology: not Nazis.

Actual SS Nazis: not Nazis.

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⚡️🇪🇪Estonia announced the transfer of the Role 2 mobile field hospital, which will save the lives of our soldiers at the front, - Rustem Umerov, the Ministry of Defense of 🇺🇦Ukraine, informed

This is already the 4th machine transferred by the Estonian Center Defense Investment (ECDI) in cooperation with partners.

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Here is the situation on Tuesday, October 3, 2023.

Fighting At least two people were killed and eight injured in Russian shelling of Ukraine’s southern Kherson region. Governor Oleksandr Prokudin said the attacks hit residential areas, shops, medical facilities and other civilian infrastructure. Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov said the city will build Ukraine’s first fully underground school to protect pupils from Russia’s frequent bomb and missile attacks. While many schools in front-line regions have been forced to teach online, Kharkiv organised some 60 separate classrooms in its metro system before the school year that started on September 1, creating space for more than 1,000 children to study there. Diplomacy and politics European Union foreign ministers showed their support for Ukraine at a meeting in Kyiv, their first outside the bloc’s borders, after a pro-Russian candidate won an election in Slovakia and the United States’s Congress left Ukraine war aid out of a temporary spending bill. “The EU remains united in its support to Ukraine. … I don’t see any member state folding on their engagement,” EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell told reporters. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the duration of the war was linked to support from its allies. “Our victory directly depends on our cooperation: the more strong and principled steps we take together, the sooner this war will end,” Zelenskyy said in a statement on his website, urging the EU to expand sanctions on Russia and Iran, which has supplied attack drones for Russian forces. He also called for the “acceleration” of work to direct “frozen Russian assets to finance the restoration of war-torn Ukraine”.

The US White House said it had been in touch with allies and partners about funding for Ukraine and stressed that there was continued bipartisan support in Congress to continue to support the country. Moscow said that while it expected Washington to continue its support for Ukraine, the vote in Congress was a sign of increasing divisions in Western countries over the conflict. “According to our forecasts fatigue from this conflict, fatigue from the completely absurd sponsorship of the Kyiv regime will grow in various countries, including the United States,” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said.

Weapons Germany’s economy ministry said exports of military equipment to Ukraine had grown more than fourfold so far this year, to 3.3 billion euros ($3.48bn), making Kyiv the main recipient of German weapons. Denmark’s Ministry of Defence said it will spend 100 million kroner ($14.1m) in a joint European order for ammunition to help Ukraine. On Friday, the European Defence Agency (EDA) said seven EU countries had ordered 155mm artillery rounds for Kyiv and to replenish depleted stocks. Delivery is expected in 2024. The first batch of Leopard 2 tanks sent for repair in Poland after being damaged on the battlefield have been returned to Ukraine, according to the Polish Armaments Group. Germany and Poland agreed to set up a repair centre for the tanks in July.

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Polish minister apologises for falsely accusing Ukraine of not inviting Poland to defence forum OCT 3, 2023

Poland and Ukraine have clashed over the absence of Polish defence firms from an industry forum in Kyiv at the weekend. The Polish state assets minsiter eventually apologised after realising he had falsely accused Ukraine of not inviting Poland.

Meanwhile, the Polish foreign minister skipped a meeting of his EU counterparts in Kyiv yesterday, saying that the decision was due to a current “downturn” in relations with Ukraine.

Though Poland has been a close ally of Ukraine since Russia’s invasion last year, the two countries are currently embroiled in a dispute over Ukrainian grain exports, which Warsaw has unilaterally banned.

Yesterday, the majority of the EU’s foreign ministers gathered in Kyiv for their first ever summit in a country outside the EU itself. They agreed a €5 billion package of additional military aid for Ukraine.

However, Poland was among a small number of countries that did not send its foreign minister, Zbigniew Rau, with one of his deputies attending instead.

“My absence from the meeting of EU foreign ministers in Kyiv is partly an expression of the fact that, when it comes to relations between Poland and Ukraine, we are entering a period of decline,” Rau told Polsat News.

“I wouldn’t call it retaliation,” he added, emphasising that Poland still has “common strategic interests with Ukraine”. However, when it comes to “national interests we have divergent interests and misunderstandings regarding the transit of Ukrainian grain through Poland”.

Rau’s remarks yesterday followed a war of words with Ukraine over a defence industry meeting last weekend in Kyiv. While firms from over 30 countries were present, there was no representative from Poland.

“Shame on you, Mr Zelensky,” tweeted Krzysztof Lipiec, an MP from Poland’s ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party. “Where is Poland? This is how Ukraine thanks Poland?”

In an interview with Radio Zet yesterday, Poland’s minister for state assets Jacek Sasin said that “PGZ [Poland’s state defence holding firm] as a company was not invited”. He added that “we have been dealing with a series of unfriendly gestures from Ukraine recently”.

“I am afraid that this is a matter of current political interest on the part of the Ukrainian authorities, who believe that when an [election] campaign is underway in Poland, it is better to side with Germany and to play for a change of government in Poland,” said Sasin.”This will have a negative impact on Ukraine.”

However, that version of events was disputed by Ukraine’s ambassador to Poland, Vasyl Zvarych, who told broadcaster TVN that “Poland was among the first to be invited to this event” and its absence is “a question for the Polish side”.

Shortly after, Sasin issued a statement admitting that he had been wrong and that PGZ had, in fact, been invited to the forum in Kyiv. “I am sorry for the misunderstanding,” he wrote.

Sasin added that PGZ “decided not to attend due to the circumstances described below” and shared a statement from the firm. However, the statement did not provide any reason for PGZ’s decision not to attend the forum and instead talked about the firm’s existing good relations with Ukraine.

The government’s conflict with Kyiv has drawn criticism from the opposition, who have accused it of harming Poland’s relations with Ukraine in order to benefit the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party’s current campaign for parliamentary elections that will take place on 15 October.

“Poland as a country is currently paying the cost of an election campaign in which PiS subordinates the issues of national defence and relations with Ukraine to its own political benefits,” said Czesław Mroczek, an opposition MP and deputy head of the parliamentary defence committee.

“If Poland excludes itself from the group of countries and companies that will participate in the rebuilding of Ukraine, that will cause terrible harm to the interests and economy of our country,” Mroczek told industry news service Defence24.

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injuries because he got blown up by his own comrades, not Ukraine Matthew Loh Oct 3, 2023

Russia has refused to compensate a soldier who was injured by his own comrades in Ukraine. A court ruling against Khizri Kurazov, a corporal, says he was wounded by an accidental mine blast. But he's not eligible for a standard $30,000 payment because he wasn't injured in the line of fire.

A Russian corporal wounded in Ukraine has been denied standard compensation for his war injuries because they were inflicted by his own comrades instead of Ukrainian forces, court documents show.

The case of Khizri Kurazov, a corporal of the military unit 3737 of the Russian Guard, was detailed in a September 8 ruling in Russia's southern district military court.

The ruling against Kurazov was earlier reported on by independent Russian media.

Kurazov, a contract soldier, was wounded in Ukraine by a mine accidentally detonated by fellow Russian personnel, according to the September 8 decision.

His injuries were certified by a Russian military hospital on March 14, and the cause of his wounds was listed as improper handling of ammunition by someone in his unit, the ruling said.

The corporal applied for a claim of 3 million rubles, or $30,000, according to the decision. Russia has disbursed these payments since early 2022 to soldiers wounded in the invasion of Ukraine.

But on May 25, an investigation run by Kurazov's combat unit found that the corporal's wounds weren't directly associated with any combat missions or tasks, and instead were inflicted by the mistakes of another serviceman.

It ruled that there were no grounds for the corporal to receive the lump-sum payment, and Kurazov's commander ordered a refusal of the claim, the judicial decision said.

A military court in the Nalchik Garrison also refused to grant Kurazov's payment on June 27, per the court filing.

Kurazov argued that the one-time payment to injured troops should be given to any Russian soldier wounded in Ukraine, including the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the filing said.

He appealed the Nalchik Garrison military court's decision, bringing his case to the southern district military court in Rostov-on-Don in August.

But a panel of three military court judges — Viktor Alekseevich Kostin, Dmitry Viktorovich Merkulov, and Magomedbasir Gapurovich Shuaipov — ruled on September 8 that the original decision should be upheld.

They agreed that requirements for the $30,000 payment include the soldier being wounded in direct combat. However, they added that Kurazov has the right to apply for other types of compensation.

Kurazov's refused claim is one of several that have been contested by injured Russian soldiers, such as contract soldier Aziz Magomedov, who was denied payment after receiving initial treatment in April 2022 at a city hospital instead of a military one, Radio Free Liberty reported.

Russia's Defense Ministry did not immediately respond to Insider's request for comment sent outside regular business hours.

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Why Ukraine Could Start Manufacturing the Finnish Patria AMV Instead of Its Domestic BTR-4?

Posted Today

The Patria AMV is a versatile Finnish armoured military vehicle with an 8×8 chassis that can serve as a self-propelled platform for various weapon systems. The AMV features a modular architecture that allows for many different versions of this vehicle, including infantry transporters, self-propelled mortars, etc. Ukraine is buying quite a few Patria AMVs and may even manufacture them in the future. What about their domestic BTR-4?

In 2023 April 1 it was reported that Ukraine ordered 100 Patria AMVs from the Polish production lines and will pay for these machines with US and EU financial aid money. President Volodymyr Zelensky later specified that Ukraine would purchase 200 Patria AMVs in total.

Finland is now reportedly considering manufacturing the Patria AMV in Ukraine. Why not? Ukraine is an industrious country and it needs weapons. But, as Defense Express reminds us, Ukraine has its own similar machine called the BTR-4.

The Patria AMV XP, which is of most interest to Ukraine, weighs up to 32 tonnes. It is a universal self-propelled armoured vehicle with a good level of protection against anti-tank mines. The Patria AMV XP is normally armed with a 14.5 mm machine gun or a 30 mm autocannon. There are often anti-tank missiles there too. Finland also has a 120 mm mortar on the Patria AMV platform – it is that versatile.

The Patria AMV has a crew of up to 3 people and behind them, there is room for 8-12 troops. AMV has a very strong independent hydropneumatic 8×8 chassis and a powerful engine. The Patria AMV can accelerate to 100 km/h on the road, while in water it can reach about 10 km/h. Ukraine needs such weapons badly. But what about the Ukrainian BTR-4?

The BTR-4 Bucephalus is an infantry transporter developed in Kharkiv. It has some similarities to the Patria AMV – it also has an 8×8 chassis, carries 8 troops as passengers, and has a 3-person crew. Even the 30mm autocannon is similar.

However, at the moment there is no information about the production of BTR-4 – it is possible that it has stopped. It’s not even that important – if Ukraine has an opportunity to replace the BTR-4 with the Finnish Patria AMV, it probably should.

The BTR-4 has been in service only since 2014, but the suspension of this machine was developed in Soviet times. The BTR-4 is not as well protected. In addition, the suspension of this machine will not support much more weight, so the development of the BTR-4 into other systems is hardly possible.

Of course, the BTR-4 has its advantages. For example, the Ukrainian machine is cheaper. But that’s only because its technology is lagging behind. So, if Ukraine can welcome the production of the Patria AMV, it will be a smart decision. The BTR-4s did their job in the beginning of the Russian invasion but now Ukraine’s firepower is rapidly developing.

Written by Povilas M.

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Let’s talk about our motivation to fight. We are fighting on our own land — to protect our loved ones, our way of life, and our right to be free. We have a question for those who have come to occupy our cities and villages, destroy our homes, torture civilians, slaughter women and children: What exactly are you fighting for?

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Next package of EU sanctions should contain restrictions against Rosatom and diamond industry of Russian Federation, - Shmyhal

Ukraine expects that the 12th package of sanctions against Russia will contain restrictions against Rosatom.

This was announced by Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, Censor.NET reports.

During the meeting with the heads of foreign affairs of the EU countries, Shmyhal outlined the fundamental directions of support for Ukraine.

"Sanctions. We expect that the 12th package will close loopholes for the aggressor. It should also contain restrictions against Rosatom and Russia's diamond industry.

Weapon. The interaction of the Ukrainian defense industry with the defense enterprises of the EU countries is extremely important. The Ukrainian military-industrial complex must continue to develop.

Finances. Our priorities are clear: direct budget support and funds for recovery.

Our way to the EU. We expect that negotiations will begin this year. We want to move as quickly as possible, particularly in terms of economic integration.

Formula of guarantees of peace and security. Thanks to the European Commission for the support. Mr. Borrell's words that the peace formula is the only basis for international efforts to end the war are important," the statement said. Source: https://censor.net/en/n3447116

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Russian agents are present in all aspects of Ukrainian life, starting with parliament

The adoption of a bill that potentially gives the Ukrainian authorities almost unlimited control over the Internet, similar to the FSS in Russia, could have negative consequences for the country.

The Daily Beast writes about this, drawing attention to the fact that despite the statement about the fight against Kremlin agents, the extensive network of Russian agents seems to be still integrated into all aspects of Ukrainian life, from the parliament to the mass media, Censor.NET reports.

According to the former head of the Donetsk RMA Serhii Taruta, the new efforts of lawmakers to grant the State Service of Special Communications extraordinary powers, provided for by draft laws such as Draft Law No. 8087 regarding access to information systems of enterprises and organizations, may lead to even more destructive influence of Russia on our state and its structure. He is sure that modern Russian intelligence works now with more subtle methods, but is as dangerous as ever.

"Any attempts to concentrate all power in one institution are dangerous. ... The concentration of power in one pair of hands without control by democratic institutions can become someone's effort to totalitarian control over the information space," he said in a comment to the publication.

Ivan Petukhov, President of one of the oldest IT companies of Ukraine "Adamant", Vice President of the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs suggests that the new law may be deliberately designed for corruption and abuse by Russian agents working in Ukraine.

"I am not sure whether the author of the draft law is an agent, but the agent network is large, I personally demand an investigation into the participation of deputies from pro-Russian parties in this," he said in a comment to the American mass media.

Oleh Chernobay, a member of the Bar Council of the Kyiv region, told The Daily Beast that one state department cannot be given so much authority. "If this draft law is adopted, the service will get access to the confidential data of lawyers' clients. With this draft law, all functions will be accumulated by one department - this is wrong," he noted.

According to the newspaper, from the first days of the battle for Kyiv, Ukrainian intelligence caught Russian spies, including employees of the Ukrainian special services, accused of collecting and passing state secrets to Russian representatives, as well as of trying to influence personnel decisions in the security agencies of Ukraine. The high-profile cases of Shufrych, Sivkovich, Kulinich, and other high-ranking officials are only the tip of the iceberg and the beginning of the path that Ukraine must go through before all the tentacles connecting the power structures in Kyiv with the Kremlin are severed.

Draft Law No. 8087 is written in such a way that it gives the State Special Communications Service with the involvement of the SSU and the Cyber Police the right to full access at any time to any server in Ukraine and extends to all subjects without exception, including the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

Censor.NET wrote that these inspections pose a threat to national security because one "mole" in the system means that the ruscists have access to almost any information. When creating such legislative initiatives, one should clearly understand the consequences of such legislation for the country. Source: https://censor.net/en/n3447120

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Sumy’s Mayor and Head of Infrastructure Detained on Bribery Charges A joint operation conducted by Ukraine’s SBU and NABU has uncovered an alleged shakedown scheme involving garbage collecting in the northern Ukrainian city of Sumy.

by Kyiv Post | October 3, 2023

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported on Oct. 2 that the Mayor of Sumy was detained along with the city’s infrastructure chief on charges of bribery in a joint operation conducted with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU).

Olexandr Lysenko, the mayor of Sumy and Olexandr Zhurba, the director of the infrastructure department, allegedly demanded bribes from various local businesses for a total of Hr.2.13 million ($58,000) to ensure “unimpeded business in the city,” the SBU said.

They “imposed tribute,” on a local company that was engaged in garbage removal, according to the SBU. They also took money for the executive committee of the Sumy City Council to establish a new economically justified tariff for household waste management. And if they refused to pay, then they would be threatened with “artificial obstacles in doing business.”

According to the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), from November 2022 to October 2023, the investigation documented the receipt of Hr.2.13 million ($58,000) in illicit income.

“On Oct. 2, 2023 said individuals were caught ‘red-handed’ immediately after receiving the third tranche of the agreed funds – Hr.1,430,000 hryvnias ($3,870),” SAPO reported.

As per Ukrainian legal procedures, the suspects were issued notices of suspicion pending the determination of a bail amount, if any.”

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Estonian Defense Minister visits Kyiv, announces field hospital donation I reassure you that Estonia will stand with Ukraine and will provide as much assistance as necessary,” Estonian Defense Minister said.

BY IRYNA VOICHUK 03/10/2023

Ukraine’s Defense Minister Rustem Umerov met with Estonian counterpart Hanno Pevkur, who is visiting Ukraine, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense reported.

Umerov thanked Pevkur for Estonia’s constant support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, plus substantial material and technical assistance during Russia’s full-scale war.

“Thank you to the entire Estonian people for the constant and sincere support of Ukraine. We always feel your support on diplomatic, political, economic fronts. We highly appreciate everything Estonia is doing for us during this difficult time of war,” Umerov said.

The foreign delegation was briefed on the current situation on the battlefield and Ukraine’s pressing defense needs. The sides discussed prospects for military cooperation in depth, including implementing bilateral projects to enhance the capabilities of Ukraine’s Armed Forces.

Areas of focus included an IT coalition launched at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Ramstein to support Ukraine’s forces in cyberspace and ensure secure, resilient IT infrastructure for Ukraine’s Defense Forces. Estonian instructors will provide professional training for Ukrainian service members, including “train the trainers” programs for Ukrainian instructors.

Regarding medical support, the Estonian delegation announced handing over a mobile Role 2 field hospital to save lives on the frontlines, the fourth such unit donated in cooperation with Ukraine’s partners.

Germany and Iceland also contributed funding for the joint international project this time. Umerov symbolically accepted the hospital key from Pevkur before passing it to the Commander of Ukraine’s Medical Forces, Major General Tetiana Ostashchenko. The Defense Minister expressed heartfelt gratitude on behalf of the Ukrainian people for the vital donation.

Pevkur offered words of encouragement to Ukraine and emphasized his country will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukraine until victory.

“I know how difficult this time is for your country. Russia has violated hundreds of norms and principles of international law regarding Ukraine. I reassure you that Estonia will stand with Ukraine and will provide as much assistance as necessary,” Pevkur stated.

The Estonian delegation and Ukrainian Defense Ministry representatives paid respects to fallen Ukrainian soldiers at the Wall of Remembrance in St. Michael’s Square. The officials also visited Kyiv Oblast cities that suffered from Russia’s aggression.

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At meeting between Biden and Zelenskyy, historic decision was reached on joint production of weapons, - Ambassador Markarova

In Washington, Volodymyr Zelenskyy discussed assistance to Ukraine and the situation on the battlefield with US President Joe Biden. They also reached an agreement on joint weapons production, which is currently being implemented by teams from both countries.

This was stated in an interview with Ukrinform by Ukraine's Ambassador to Washington, Oksana Markarova, Censor.NET reports.

"The presidents discussed assistance to Ukraine, the development of the situation on the battlefield - not only the capabilities we need and where to find them but also, and perhaps most importantly, a historic decision was reached on joint arms production," the ambassador said.

According to her, the agreements were practical. At the meeting, the presidents discussed and reached agreements, which are now being implemented by the teams of both countries.

Markarova stressed that this is a new format of cooperation in the field of defence production in Ukraine. The main areas that the two countries will work on are all defence technologies, including air defence.

"Today, we receive a lot of capabilities from the United States that are produced by American companies - from artillery to various equipment, vehicles, other types of weapons and air defence systems. Therefore, everything that we can work out with the companies for production in Ukraine will be supported at the level of the two countries and is now being developed as a joint programme," the ambassador said.

She also called Zelenskyy's visit to the United States "very successful" given the results of his meetings in New York and Washington.

The Ambassador also shared details of the President's meeting with members of the U.S. Congress, including the Speaker and party leaders of the House of Representatives and the party leadership of the Senate.

"It was extremely important to talk frankly behind closed doors with the leaders and members of both parties and chambers. The United States, as you know, has entered an active phase of the election process, and this certainly affects many things," the diplomat added.

It is important for Ukraine to maintain and deepen strong bipartisan support. "That is why the meetings in Congress and our work in general were aimed at this," Markarova concluded. Source: https://censor.net/en/n3447142

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02 Oct: FORWARD! Ukrainians BREACH RUSSIAN DEFENSE SOUTH OF BAKHMUT | War in Ukraine Explained

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As the world navigates an era marked by increasingly complex and unpredictable geopolitical currents, a recently unveiled strategy document from within the echelons of Russia's strategic think-tanks has caught the undivided attention of global intelligence circles. This document, purportedly shaped under the stewardship of A. Karaganov, a luminary in Russian academic and policy advisory landscapes, sketches a daunting trajectory for Ukraine, a nation persistently at the vortex of geopolitical power plays. A meticulous analysis of this document, diving deep into its intricate narratives, core propositions, and intended reverberations, is instrumental in decoding the evolving strategic postures, underlying aspirations, and anticipated maneuvers of the Russian polity.

Background and Credibility of Contributors A. Karaganov stands as a colossal figure in the labyrinthine realms of Russian strategic thought and policy articulation. As the guiding light of Moscow's distinguished economic university and the key strategist behind the council for foreign and security policies, his imprints on Russia's external policy dynamics are profound. Karaganov's track record, steeped in intimate engagements with Kremlin's policy machinery, implies that the formulations within this document might transition from mere theoretical constructs to actionable policy blueprints. Furthermore, beyond Karaganov's persona, the gravitas of this paper is accentuated by the collective wisdom and strategic acumen of a coterie of Russian intellectuals and policy mavens, each renowned in their domains. Their collective endorsement underscores the urgency and significance with which the global intelligence community should approach and interpret the document's contents.

Key Strategies and Directives Nuclear Proliferation

Karaganov's leaked document showcases a potentially revolutionary perspective on nuclear strategy, veering dangerously away from widely accepted international conventions and treaties. The dossier emphasizes the idea of empowering selected non-nuclear states with nuclear capabilities, a move that would not merely alter but could entirely redefine the parameters of worldwide nuclear relations.

By endorsing the distribution of nuclear weaponry beyond the conventional P5 nations (comprising the US, UK, Russia, China, and France), the proposed strategy is an outright challenge to the foundational integrity of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Established with the core mission to halt nuclear proliferation and to promote disarmament, adopting the tactics in this document would invert this mission, ushering in new nuclear participants into the global arena. Such a seismic shift would invariably instigate countries worldwide to reassess their existing nuclear doctrines and defense postures.

Adding to the alarm is the document's insinuation that Russia might reconsider or even violate its obligations to prevailing nuclear arms control accords, particularly its agreements with the United States. Historically, pacts such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and its subsequent iterations have acted as foundational pillars, providing a modicum of stability to the often tenuous US-Russia dynamic. They have instituted transparency mandates and delineated clear constraints on both nations' substantial nuclear stockpiles. A deviation or potential abandonment of these pacts would inject a fresh bout of volatility into their bilateral relations, potentially motivating other countries to question their own treaty obligations, thereby diluting international confidence and multilateral collaborations.

Although the document remains elusive about the specific countries slated to benefit from this proposed nuclear distribution, even the hint of such a strategy complicates international geopolitics significantly. Depending on the chosen beneficiaries, such a move could destabilize regional equilibriums, catalyzing localized nuclear races, intensifying regional animosities, and imposing unforeseen diplomatic hurdles. This envisaged shift in nuclear power distribution, particularly if it involves geopolitically sensitive zones, presents a complex puzzle for global intelligence agencies to dissect and understand.

Another critical dimension to consider is the increased vulnerability associated with introducing new nuclear players. Without a comprehensive, stringent oversight mechanism, there's an amplified risk of nuclear materials being appropriated by rogue entities or non-state actors. As the world continues to confront multifaceted terrorist threats, this strategy could amplify global security risks, raising the stakes to unparalleled levels.

Dismantling Ukraine

The document in question provides an extensive roadmap that seeks to methodically dismantle Ukraine's foundational structures and key institutions, threatening its very existence as an independent nation. This audacious strategy revolves around a multi-pronged approach targeting Ukraine's critical infrastructures—spanning its energy grids, communication networks, transport systems, healthcare services, and more. The overarching goal here appears to be a deliberate devolution of Ukraine from its current stature as an emerging, modernized nation to a state resembling primitive agricultural societies. However, this envisaged transformation is not merely an internal reconfiguration; it is deeply rooted in a broader geopolitical scheme aiming to curb Ukraine's assertiveness, relevance, and diplomatic clout in international forums.

But the scope of this ominous strategy doesn't conclude with the mere decimation of infrastructure. Perhaps the most chilling aspect of this blueprint is the proposition of a large-scale, orchestrated migration of Ukrainian citizens to remote areas like Siberia. Such an audacious move echoes dark historical chapters where communities were subjected to forced migrations under oppressive regimes, events that invariably culminated in colossal humanitarian catastrophes. The logistics of executing a displacement of this magnitude would be staggering, encompassing challenges ranging from the sheer physical transportation of millions to the complexities of ensuring sustainable resettlement in unfamiliar terrains. Such an operation would invariably lead to a litany of human rights transgressions—from the tragic loss of human lives, tearing apart of families, and the enduring mental and emotional scars on the displaced communities. Furthermore, a maneuver of this magnitude would not remain an insular Ukrainian crisis for long. The ripple effects of such a colossal demographic upheaval would reverberate across Europe, straining international relations, upending regional stability, and compelling a concerted global intervention to address its multifaceted implications.

Restructuring Global Diplomacy

The strategic document under scrutiny elucidates a radical overhaul of the prevailing world order, advocating for a seismic shift in the contours of global diplomacy. Central to this audacious blueprint is the envisaged emergence of a redefined multipolar world, one that ostensibly dilutes the entrenched hegemony of Western-centric powers and potentially repositions Russia not just as a pivotal player but possibly at the vortex of this global metamorphosis. Such a vision represents more than a mere divergence—it hints at a comprehensive reorientation from the bedrock principles that have characterized the international diplomatic fabric since the culmination of the Second World War.

At the heart of this ambitious narrative is an insinuation that Russia might be contemplating a more assertive stance, potentially bypassing or even upending time-honored diplomatic norms, agreements, and established treaties. The implicit message is a Russia that no longer acquiesces to a restrained role confined to regional dynamics but aspires for a grander, more dominant presence on the world stage. In practical terms, this might manifest in Russia reassessing its allegiance to existing diplomatic partnerships, perhaps jettisoning some in favor of forging fresh alliances. These would likely be predicated on tangible strategic advantages as opposed to mere ideological synergies. Such a profound reengineering of its diplomatic posture could also involve Russia questioning the legitimacy and relevance of existing international forums and consortiums, with a possible inclination towards pioneering alternate platforms that resonate more harmoniously with its strategic objectives.

The audacity of this diplomatic blueprint is further accentuated by Russia's apparent willingness to revisit its obligations to cornerstone non-proliferation accords and even go a step further—by endorsing and perhaps facilitating the nuclear ambitions of certain third-party nations. Such a bold stance, if translated into policy, would undeniably send shockwaves through the corridors of global power, necessitating a reevaluation of established strategic doctrines and compelling nations to recalibrate their diplomatic and security blueprints. The world that this document portends is one marked by a dynamism of shifting alliances, escalating geopolitical jostling, and a constantly evolving diplomatic milieu. Gone would be the relatively structured and binary constructs of the Cold War epoch, supplanted by a labyrinthine web of interactions, alliances, and rivalries, making the global stage a theater of intricate, multifaceted, and ever-evolving diplomatic choreography.

Domestic Directives with Potential Global Implications

The strategy paper delves with granular detail into Russia's nuanced interactions with Central Asian migrant workers, highlighting the intricate interplay between domestic policies and broader geopolitical aspirations. Central Asia, with its rich tapestry of cultures and histories, has long been a wellspring of labor for Russia. With a deep-rooted migration pattern, workers from this region have historically been integrated into key sectors of the Russian economy, particularly in the realms of construction, agriculture, and service industries. The document postulates a marked enhancement in the living standards and societal acceptance of these migrant workers. This includes not only creating a more congenial environment but also launching proactive measures to confront and dismantle the edifice of racial prejudices they routinely encounter.

Such overtures signify more than mere internal reforms; they hint at a broader geopolitical calculus. By advancing the quality of life for Central Asian migrants, Russia potentially reinforces its soft power allure over the Central Asian mosaic of republics, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This is not solely about benevolence or internal societal harmony. It's a well-crafted maneuver to project Russia as an appealing and welcoming destination, possibly more enticing than other migration magnets. Such a strategy serves a dual-fold objective: It fortifies Russia's stature as the preeminent regional hegemon, while also ensuring a continuous stream of labor, vital for its economic engines.

Yet, the document presents a perplexing dichotomy. On one hand, there's a palpable warmth towards Central Asian migrants, but on the other, there's an unmistakable assertiveness towards Ukraine. The paper's outlines for Ukraine range from a systematic weakening of its infrastructural spine to even more ominous prospects like large-scale human displacements. This presents a picture of Russia's regional maneuverings as one riddled with contradictions—cultivating camaraderie with Central Asia while manifesting dominance over Ukraine. It's an intricate dance, seemingly choreographed to pull certain neighbors into a tighter embrace while simultaneously sidelining others.

This duality, this play of light and shade in Russia's approach towards its neighbors, offers a compelling insight into the intricacies of its regional strategy. It's a testament to the multi-layered, multifarious nature of Russian geopolitical designs, where overtures of friendship towards certain quarters don't inhibit a more forceful posture towards others. Such complex policy interweavings necessitate a profound comprehension of Russia's overarching strategic imperatives and the potential global reverberations they might precipitate. For those immersed in intelligence analysis, deciphering these policy intricacies and prognosticating their ramifications on the global chessboard becomes paramount.

The Humanitarian Implications Ukraine's intricate mosaic of civilizations, traditions, and unwavering spirit risks grave implications from the disclosed strategies. Beyond the potential obliteration of critical infrastructure, this plan paints a grim picture of the possible dislocation and upheaval for millions of Ukrainian citizens. Each individual's story, hope, and endeavor symbolize the living testament of a nation's will to survive and thrive. The Ukrainian populace isn't just a demographic entity; it embodies centuries of shared memories, achievements, and aspirations that are inextricably linked to geopolitical dynamics. Thus, any move to destabilize or disrupt this fabric doesn't merely represent a political act but an affront to humanity itself.

Furthermore, with Ukraine being Europe's breadbasket and a land replete with natural resources, these actions could disrupt not only the socio-cultural equilibrium but also the economic and ecological balance. The populace's resilience and adaptive capacities will be tested, and their stories of determination in the face of such adversities will shape the chronicles for generations to come.

Implications and Imperatives for Intelligence Analysts Anticipating Policy Shifts: Considering the stature and influence of the document's contributors, there's a pronounced possibility that this could herald a paradigm shift in the Kremlin's geopolitical strategies. It is, therefore, of paramount importance for intelligence operatives across the spectrum to bolster their surveillance on Russia's military, economic, and diplomatic initiatives. Enhanced signal and human intelligence operations, combined with cyber reconnaissance, will be vital tools to ascertain early indicators of this policy's actualization.

Regional Security Paradigms: Implementing the tactics and strategies highlighted would invariably lead to tectonic shifts in the broader security milieu of Eastern Europe and potentially even Central Asia. Given the multi-dimensional implications of these changes, it becomes imperative for intelligence agencies worldwide to pool their resources, collaborate more closely, and integrate their expertise. A consolidated intelligence approach will enable nations to better anticipate, understand, and, if needed, counteract the multifaceted challenges arising from such policy dynamics.

Reimagining Global Diplomacy: The outlines of Russia's potential pivot towards aggressively shaping a multipolar world order necessitate an urgent and forward-thinking review of prevailing diplomatic tactics and alliances. As the chessboard of international relations undergoes a potential rearrangement, intelligence agencies worldwide must be at the forefront in decoding these transitions. This involves not only understanding new strategic alliances and recalibrations but also foreseeing the economic, technological, and socio-political implications of such a pivot.

Humanitarian Watch: Beyond the overt political and military facets of the proposition, there looms a dark shadow of a possible humanitarian catastrophe of an unprecedented scale. As the guardians of global stability, intelligence agencies must proactively expand their focus to include predicting, understanding, and even aiding in orchestrating responses to such crises. Collaborative intelligence, combined with diplomatic efforts, can ensure that amidst geopolitical games, the inherent value and sanctity of human lives and dignity are never sidelined.

Concluding Insights "Karaganov's Blueprint" isn't just a policy proposition – it's a window into the possible recalibration of global geopolitical dynamics. The depth of its recommendations provides a startling vision of Russia's potential future actions and their implications for the international order. This isn't merely about a shift in foreign policy strategy; it suggests a broader realignment of international power dynamics. Its contents emphasize the acute need for robust intelligence capabilities, refined diplomatic strategies, and a renewed commitment to international cooperation. For analysts immersed in this geopolitical puzzle, understanding the nuances and potential trajectories is paramount. While dissecting the strategies and tactics proposed in this blueprint, it remains pivotal to always center the experiences, hopes, and resilience of the Ukrainian people. Their stories, history, and aspirations should be the compass that guides all strategies. Protecting their rights, ensuring their security, and preserving their cultural identity should always remain paramount in any global response.

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