Going back to Hardin, the fundamental thesis of the tragedy of commons is that as society scales past a certain point, regulation is the only way to deal with the over-exploitation of things that are beneficial to one person but carry an externality borne by others.

In tribes / small societies (and presumably your workplace!), that regulation might come from ostracisation of people who over-exploit by their neighbours. In a large society, it could come from a government (and could come in many forms - subsidies, taxes, laws prohibiting or rationing activities, laws requiring counterbalancing good).

Now consider the climate crisis. It has the externality (if I burn fossil fuels, I cause emissions that warms the planet for everyone, and leads to rising sea levels, lots of people losing land, losses of biodiversity and the benefits that provides, and extreme weather events). Most of the impact of my own emissions would not be felt by me - in fact, most would be felt by future generations - making it an externality. At least until society transitions fully to non-fossil energy sources, in the absence of any regulation stopping me, burning fossil fuels is likely more convenient. So it meets all the requirements to be a tragedy of the commons.

As a result, that analysis tells us that, if we accept Hardin's thesis, some kind of government intervention is needed to control emissions. Sadly, due to regulatory capture, in many countries there is not enough of that happening, hence why this has become such a crisis.