And Iran, according to the article

Wow. The state of Israel is really piling on the reasons to hate it these days.

And Russia was doing it just a few years ago, too.

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/vladimir-putin/russia-spoofing-gps-vast-scale-stop-drones-approaching-putin-report-n987376#

The article says the spoofing was first recorded in September from Iran, then Israel started doing some after the October Hammas attacks

Iran has been doing this shit for decades. I'm sure Israel has too.

Basically, they figure out what a GPS receiver would hear if it was receiving signals from a specific location, say "London". They then broadcast those exact signals. Any receiver that hears them now thinks it is in "London".

Start with the aircraft's actual position, and update the spoofed location based where it actually is and and its intended destination, and you can get it to go where you want it.

If the aircraft is trying to fly to London, for example,, and you want it to turn to the east of its track, you start spoofing that it has drifted west on its track to London. The aircraft thinks it is west of London, and turns to the east to get to spoofed-London.

Is that the one with Jonathan Pryce as the villain? That was a good one

Do you have something I can read about this? It's a little vague, so hard for me to search, and it sounds like something I would be interested in. Thanks

Modern IRUs also take input from multiple sources (GPS, Navaids) to update their drift error. With spoofed GPS, bad drift corrections are made and when the navigation solution eventually fails the IRU is just as unusable.

How do IRUs work do to give you location?

But the article mentioned that "the spoofing corrupts the Inertial Reference System". How?

I can't see how omega and similar were not just as susceptible to this type of attack. Active outside in positioning almost always has this vulnerability.

Huh what do you propose then, go back to the 1960s and ensure they are only using VOR and DME ground equipment. There isn't a check sum to check on GPS/GNSS it just a bunch of satellites broadcasting what they think is the correct time. If you jam those and replace them with signals close enough but wrong values you can trick the math that's used inside the GPS/GNSS receiver that computes the the position (and velocity), and it looks like this signal can be introduced slow enough to trick the receiver in real-world applications. One trick to protect yourself is to ensure the signals you receive are from the direction you expect but we aren't going to attach directional antennas on every face of a civilian aircraft, to ensure the strongest signal is from the top of the plane and not the bottom. Essentially civil navigation equipment isn't supposed to be messed with and if it is authorities are supposed to go over and arrest and fine the idiots doing things over the radio they shouldnt. When the bad guy is a government well yea I guess that plan doesn't work and governing bodies such as ICAO should impose penalties like no commerical aircraft from companies from those countries are not allowed elsewhere.

GPS guided drone attacks. Civilian GPS top out at 300 m a second. Anything beyond that is a missile and GPS refuses to work unless you have one of the special government GPS chips without the limiter.

The latest generations of gnss receivers have spoofing and jamming mitigation and detection features included with the chip, and multi-band rx technology to sync to more constellations simultaneously and do exactly what you're talking about. Before then, the spoofing/jamming detection would likely need a software implementation after the receiver. There are different types of spoofing/jamming, all of which are detected and mitigated in different ways.

I don't know the commercial aircraft industry standards for updating technology, but I wouldn't be surprised if most commercial aircraft don't have what you're talking about.

The problem is with the way GPS works. Your device gets telemetry from the satellites. A fake signal can screw up the whole system.

Yes Galileo supports encryption. But as far as I know it's not in use. Has been trialled only. But I know all Airbus aircraft only support GPS satellites and nothing else (yet). I assume Boeing, being American would be the same then.

As far as solutions go, an aircraft can navigate fine without GPS. It can update its position from ground navigation aids and if they are not available it can still Dead Reckon very well. The navigation error very slowly grows until it's out of the black spot and can use GPS or navigation aid to increase its accuracy. But this navigation error on the time frame of say an hour is a matter of kilometers at most, not dozens.

Nope. And more importantly, it looks like nobody considered what might happen if the signal gets spoofed. The backup systems that are supposed to keep working if GPS breaks also break due to these spoofed signals.